Beginning with a definition of gerrymandering, after a brief review of the evolution of the case law on partisan gerrymandering, I propose five necessary elements of a test for when partisan gerrymandering rises to the level of unconstitutionality: (a) a clear and severe injury involving a disparate impact on a political party that serves as the vehicle for the expression of particular ideas and values; (b) effects that can be expected to be durable; (c) effects that can be shown NOT to be explicable either by features of the partisan electoral geography that impact all plans, or by chance; (d) evidence that there exist one or more remedial plans that address the constitutional violation while also satisfying, on balance, all relevant constitutional and statutory criteria at least as well as the challenged plan; and (e) compelling direct or indirect evidence of invidious partisan intent. I link these five elements to recent Supreme Court and district court opinions about an appropriate standard for partisan gerrymandering.
I. Introduction
Some of the most important decisions the Supreme Court will be making in 2018 involve redistricting, including a potentially seminal decision on a set of lower court cases up on appeal that will determine whether the Supreme Court's previous holding that partisan gerrymandering is justiciable 1 will actually have any teeth. Although I will discuss opinions by recent trial courts in partisan gerrymandering challenges, I deliberately do not focus on the factual specifics of these cases, or the credibility of particular expert witness testimony; nor do I take a position as to whether the case facts and the expert witness testimony are such that the court reached a correct decision in the case. 2 Instead, I examine the broader issues of providing an empirically and jurisprudentially grounded test for unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering that fully addresses the concerns about judicial manageability raised by the Supreme Court in past cases.
While redistricting has potentially far reaching implications for the partisan balance/partisan control in the U.S. House of Representatives and in a number of state legislatures, dealing with egregious partisan gerrymandering is not a partisan matter.
Gerrymandering now benefits Republicans in more states than it benefits Republicans , but in the past the reverse has been true. 3 Moreover, if we look at the partisan gerrymandering challenges 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Maryland, 5 the first challenges a legislative plan as a Republican-drawn partisan gerrymander, the second challenges a particular congressional district as part of a Democrat-drawn partisan gerrymander. In either case, it is the voters whose impact on electoral outcomes is minimized or canceled out and whose associational rights are violated who are the losers.
Egregious partisan gerrymandering discriminates against voters based upon their political views. Partisan gerrymandering done with the modern tools of sophisticated computer-based line drawing can "lock in" that discriminatory disparate impact for an entire decade, by creating districts that are entirely or almost entirely non-competitive. In such non-competitive districts, substantial changes in voter preference -even at the maximum magnitude we might reasonably expect when we examine constituency level data from previous elections --would lead to at most a few changes in partisan control at the district level, and perhaps none at all. Indeed, in some states, the existence of severely discriminatory gerrymandering, coupled with few or no competitive constituencies, would make (lopsided) partisan control of a legislature or a congressional delegation based on successful partisan gerrymandering impervious to change. McGann et al. (2016) show that the potential for egregious partisan gerrymandering is greatest when you have unified partisan control of both branches of the legislature and of the governorship. The proportion of states with such unified control was very high in the 2010 round of redistricting, but is now even higher. 6 Thus, if there is no legal check on partisan gerrymandering, we have good reason to expect that the level of egregious gerrymandering will McGann et al. (2016) make a compelling case that the partisan gerrymandering we see in 2010 redistricting is, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, different level from what we have seen in previous decades. They find (p. 97) that the level of partisan bias in the 2010 districting round was approximately three times that in the 2000 round. In the bulk of the states, those where line drawing is the responsibility of the legislature, consistent with previous research, The central claim in this paper is that, from a social science perspective, we should define the concept of partisan gerrymandering in terms of five elements:
(a) a clear and severe injury involving a disparate impact on a political party that serves as the vehicle for the expression of particular ideas and values;
(b) effects that can be expected to be durable; (c) effects that can be shown NOT to be explicable either by features of the partisan electoral geography that impact all plans, or by chance;
(d) evidence that there exist one or more remedial plans that address the constitutional violation while also satisfying, on balance, all relevant constitutional and statutory criteria at least as well as the challenged plan; and (e) compelling direct or indirect evidence of (invidious) partisan intent,
In the remainder of this paper I will focus on the first three of these elements. These three elements are derived from Equal Protection and First Amendment principles, 8 and the social 7 I might also note that the U.S. redistricting practices have ranked it as the next to worst offender among all the nations of the world holding reasonably free elections. Only Malaysia scores worse. See 2102 Report of the Electoral Integrity Project, p. 18. https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com (I am indebted to Professor Netina Tan for calling this reference to my attention.)
8 See, e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) ("First Amendment concerns arise where a State enacts a law that has the purpose and effect of subjecting a group of voters or their party to disfavored treatment by reason of their views. In the context of partisan gerrymandering, that means … where an apportionment has the purpose and effect of burdening a group of voters' representational rights."); Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 124 (" [E] ach political group in a State should have the same chance to elect representatives of its choice as any other political group."). Invidious partisan gerrymandering occurs when a political party intentionally redraws district lines to give itself a durable electoral advantage over the party out of power-usually by "packing" voters who affiliate with the opposing party into a few safe districts, or by "cracking" them across multiple districts to dilute their voting power. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 117 n.6 (explaining "the familiar techniques of political gerrymandering"). In so doing, am unconstitutional partisan gerrymander can discriminate against voters in their representational rights because of their views and political associations in a way that cannot realistically be ameliorated through the ordinary electoral process. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 59 60
II. Defining and Measuring Partisan Gerrymandering

A Brief History of Legal Challenges to Partisan Gerrymandering
Since 1986, when Davis v. Bandemer declared partisan gerrymandering to be justiciable and egregious gerrymandering to be potentially unconstitutional, there have been three decades of Supreme Court and lower court decisions directly responding to allegation of partisan gerrymandering. But, as of December 2017, there had never yet been a Supreme Court decision striking down a plan (or one or more districts) as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. In the cases that made it up for Supreme Court review, the Court majority asserted that it had failed to identify manageable standards to decide when a plan rises to the level of an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. In the light of these negative decisions, it became the common wisdom among the legislators drawing the lines in the redistricting of the current decade that they could do what they liked re partisan gerrymandering as long as they satisfied one person, one vote standards and did not reduce the electoral success chances of African-Americans or other protected racial and ethnic groups. 14 As a result of the Supreme Court's complete abdication of responsibility, the 2010 round saw partisan gerrymandering run amok in some states. Indeed, we even saw some redistricting authorities boasting about the fact that their plan was intended as a 14 Some academic authors (e.g., Grofman and King, 2007) took LULAC to be an open invitation to lower courts to respond to the request of Justices Souter and Ginsburg in LULAC that "further attention . . . be devoted to the administrability of such a criterion [partisan bias]at all levels of redistricting and its review." However, after 25 years in which no plan had ever been struck down as a partisan gerrymander despite the Court's holding that partisan gerrymandering was justiciable, most redistricting authorities in the 2010 round of redistricting saw LULAC as simply demonstrating that partisan gerrymandering claims were a dead letter, destined to fail. In fact, many lower courts confronted with a partisan gerrymandering challenge post-LULAC simply refused to consider the claim and asserted that, until the Supreme Court provided a standard to adjudicate the claim, their hands were tied. The decision in LULAC could also be seen as an invitation to litigants to develop a more sophisticated and multi-componented test for unconstitutional gerrymandering that incorporated but was not limited to partisan bias. And that is indeed what has happened, but not till rather late in the 2010 redistricting period (see below). 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 v. McCrory, 2016 WL 3129213, (M.D.N.C. Jun. 2, 2016 found the challenged North Carolina congressional districts constituted a racial gerrymander, "the North Carolina legislature drew new district lines, expressly eschewing reliance on any racial data and declaring that they were engaged in a partisan gerrymander" (Hasen, 2018 forthcoming, draft p. 16 Fla. 2015) ). As a result of the ruling, eight congressional districts were ordered to be redrawn, with spillover effects on other districts. An earlier legislatively drawn remedy map was rejected as failing to fully address the constitutional violations. Because the legislature was unable to agree on a new map a court drawn plan was used in 2016, and one congressional seat changed hands.The Florida decision was based on state rather than federal law, and the provisions of Florida's constitution relied upon in the case were very specific ones, added rather recently by citizen's initiative, with language not duplicated in most other state constitutions (language in Ohio's constitution put there in 2015 via a citizen initiative is a partial exception). While this particularity of the Florida case led me to believe that state law-based challenges to partisan gerrymandering were unlikely to be successful, as of January 22, 2018 the Pennsylvania state law challenge was successful. Moreover, some elements of the Florida case may also prove adaptable to the federal context, especially with respect to the standard for determining intent, the need for burden-shifting to defendants to justify the plan if a clear violation is found, the question of whether an appropriate remedy involves overturning a whole plan or only particular districts, and the amount of deference due the legislature in the remedial phase once a violation is found. When applying First Amendment jurisprudence to redistricting, we conclude that, to state a claim, the plaintiff must allege that those responsible for the map redrew the lines of his district with the specific intent to impose a burden on him and similarly situated citizens because of how they voted or the political party with which they were affiliated. In the context of redistricting, this burden is the injury that usually takes the form of vote dilution. But vote dilution is a matter of degree, and a de minimis amount of vote dilution, even if intentionally imposed, may not result in a sufficiently adverse effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights to constitute a cognizable injury. Instead, to establish the injury element of a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show that the challenged map diluted the votes of the targeted citizens to such a degree that it resulted in a tangible and concrete adverse effect. In other words, the vote dilution must make some practical difference. Finally, the plaintiff must allege causation --that, absent the mapmakers' intent to burden a particular group of voters by reason of their views, the concrete adverse impact would not have occurred. 
of effects, ruling out the possibility that effects can be attributed to geography or chance, and avoiding judgments based on evidence from at most a single election under the challenged plan.
Moreover, in each, there is expert witness testimony that the judges draw upon in addressing each of these concerns. Both also look closely at issues of intent, including consideration of the process by which the plan was created and passed and geographic features of the plan that grossly violate traditional districting criteria.
In both cases the distinction between First Amendment an Fourteenth Amendment claims appears to be more a legal distinction about how to frame constitutional bases of action than a difference in how courts should go about looking for a violation of those rights.
In Whitford, for example, the court majority asserted
[T]he First Amendment and the Equal Protection clause prohibit a redistricting scheme which (1) is intended to place a severe impediment on the effectiveness of the votes of individual citizens on the basis of their political affiliation, (2) has that effect, and (3) cannot be justified on other, legitimate legislative grounds.
The Whitford court majority found:
The plaintiffs have established … that the defendants intended and accomplished an entrenchment of the Republican Party likely to endure for the entire decennial period. They did so when the legitimate redistricting considerations neither required nor warranted the implementation of such a plan.
In Common Cause v. Rucho, the Rucho majority offered a three-pronged test requiring plaintiffs to prove:
(1) that the challenged districting plan was intended to favor or disfavor individuals or entities that support a particular candidate or political party, (2) that the districting plan burdened the political speech or associational rights of such individuals or entities, and (3) that a causal relationship existed between the governmental actor's discriminatory motivation and the First Amendment burden imposed by the districting plan.
It held that:
Partisan gerrymandering runs contrary to both the structure of the republican form of government embodied in the Constitution and fundamental individual rights preserved by the Bill of Rights. … [P]artisan gerrymandering of congressional districts constitutes a structural violation because it insulates Representatives from having to respond to the popular will, and instead renders them responsive to state legislatures or political factions thereof.
It found that: 
Defining a Gerrymander
What is gerrymandering? That is a deceptively simple question, but one which must be answered before we can begin to even think about unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. The answer I give -one that is consistent with the views of most present-day social scientists who are specialists on districting is that:
Gerrymandering occurs when a districting plan creates a disparate treatment of the vote share of the minority and majority voting blocs in a way that penalizes the minority in its ability to translate its voting support into seats compared to what we might expect from a plan drawn on the basis of neutral principles.
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Thus gerrymandering has two critical elements. It requires disparate impact, and it is to be measured relative to a baseline of a plan drawn on the basis of neutral principles. The definition above corrects an important misapprehension of the nature of gerrymandering which was once frequently asserted about legislatures using single seat plurality districts electing imposed will actually cure the partisan gerrymandering that motivated the litigation but which was not actually the subject of the litigation.
27 By the majority bloc I mean the party that is in control of the districting process. impact, but the disparate impact must be shown to be substantial, and highly durable, and with effects that cannot be explained by the nature of the electoral geography or by chance, and with effects that can be shown to have been intended. 29 Moreover, of course, there must be one or more feasible remedies for the unconstitutional disparate impact found. 28 The paradigmatic claim of this supposed equivalence is found a 1968 book, Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in Law and Politics (Oxford University Press) by Robert Dixon, arguably America's then leading expert on redistricting. He asserted: "To be brutally frank, whether or not there is a gerrymander in design, there normally will be some gerrymandering in result, as a concomitant of all district systems of legislative elections. …In a functional sense it thus may be said that districting is gerrymandering." Knowing what we know now, especially in terms of research both conceptual and empirical done over the past decade or so, the statement above is misleading. Unfortunately, the academic literature on districting has not always recognized this point. Indeed, I should be honest in noting that in my earlier writings, the present author, too, has uncritically quoted Dixon's assertion above, especially in verbal presentations. Still, I believe it is accurate to say that few if any knowledgeable social scientists today would endorse Dixon's views from nearly five decades ago. Dixon wrote at a time when the statistical properties of seats-votes relationships for plurality districts were not well understood, e.g., he wrote prior to Tufte (1973) and the extensive literature that has followed. As a guide to understanding the conditions needed to determine the existence of gerrymandering, and especially whether or not that level of gerrymandering rises to the level of unconstitutionality, this conflating of districting with gerrymandering cannot be the basis of a constitutional standard. It fails to provide a truly functional test of the partisan (or racial, or incumbency protecting) consequences of an adopted plan that distinguishes these consequences in terms of disparate impact from what might have been expected from a plan drawn according to neutral principles.
29 While the term "natural gerrymandering" has been used for gerrymandering consequences whose effects were not intended, it seems sensible to view unconstitutional partisan 
Measuring disparate impact
The first element, partisan asymmetry, is based on the idea that a citizen's representational rights must not turn on the party with which he chooses to affiliate It looks to see if there is a tangible and concrete injury in the form of disparate impact that could be the basis for a claim of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. In short, it is a standard of "neutral" treatment. This metric neither assumes nor requires that a political party is entitled to any particular election outcome. Rather, partisan symmetry requires only that if we were to "switch the names of the parties that received particular vote outcomes, the seat outcomes would also switch." 30 Unlike a claim that a party is entitled to a specified outcome, such as a number of seats proportionate to its vote share, an asymmetry standard requires only that the parties and their supporters receive equal treatment-that they have equal opportunity to translate their votes into representation.
For example, imagine that the "Democratic Party receives an average of 55% of the vote totals in a state's legislative district elections and, because of the way the district lines were drawn, it wins 70% of the legislative seats in that state." 31 . This "one piece of evidence alone" says nothing about whether any voters have been treated differently based on their political views. 32 That turns on whether the result would be different were the shoe on the other foot: If the Republican Party would also have received 70% of the seats in an election in which it garnered an average of 55% of the vote, then there is no disparate treatment.
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gerrymandering as necessarily involving intent, though this view is not shared by all social science redistricting experts and will ultimately have to be resolved by the Supreme Court. We have placed intent as the last of the five elements because it may be demonstrated indirectly from some of the earlier elements.
30 Grofman and King (2007) .
31 Id.
32 Id. 33 In a system of proportional representation (used in many European countries), seats are awarded in proportion to overall many European countries), seats are awarded in proportion to overall vote share-i.e., 55% of the statewide votes would garner about 55% of the legislative One straightforward measure of partisan asymmetry is partisan bias. It "refers to the degree to which a [map] deviates from partisan symmetry." (Grofman & King, 2007, 10 seats. "Proportional Representation," Encyclopedia Britannica (2013 ed.), https://tinyurl.com/y6welcph. As the above example illustrates, the symmetry standard requires no such result. The symmetry standard "does not require proportionality but only that the disproportionality be the same for both parties." McGann et al (2016, 65-66) .
34 Grofman & King (2007, 22) ; see also Wang (2016b: 368-374 Dahl (1956 ), Cain (1985 , Campagna and Grofman (1990), Grofman, (1983) , Niemi and Fett (1986) , Grofman, Koetzle and Brunell (1997), McGann et al (2015) , and esp. King (1990, 1994) . I would note that the concept of partisan bias (and the complementary concept of partisan responsiveness in the form of the swing ratio) are first introduced in something close to their modern form in Tufte (1973) , but similar ideas can be found in earlier statistical work as far back as the 1940s (see esp. Kendall and Yule, 1950) . Tufte (1973) I should also note that, though the measure was favorably referenced, I do not believe that the expert witness testimony presented about the efficiency gap in cases such as Gill and Rucho, was critical to the findings for plaintiffs in these cases, since each case had other types of evidence presented about measures of disparate partisan impact.
37 Alternatively we could add just add three percentage points to party A's vote share in each district to bring up Part A's vote share from 47% to 50% and subtract three percentage points from party B's vote share in each district to bring down Part B's vote share from 53 % to 50% and check to see if each party now receives 50% of the seats. If not, there is a bias in favor of one of the parties. Of course, such a bias might be explicable by geographic factors or due to chance, or it may only be temporary. Ruling out such possibilities is why we need a multipronged test. And, as noted below, there are more sophisticated approaches to assessing partisan bias that provide greater reliability. But the use of simple methods can allow a court an intuitive check on the plausibility of expert witness testimony using more sophisticated methods.
38 Wang (2016b, 372) ; see also Wang (2016a) McDonald and Best (2015) .
41 Wang (2016b, 372) 42 See King (1990, 1994) and discussion in Grofman and King (2007: 10-13 Some are more complex in their calculations than others; but they all seek to measure the same thing: the magnitude of the disparate burden (if any) that a challenged map imposes on a political party and its supporters.
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Providing evidence that effects will be durable
The second element, lack of responsiveness, perhaps better referred to as durability of effects, is distinct from partisan bias. Partisan bias can be high and yet fleeting, or it can be low and yet long lasting. Looking at the expected duration of partisan effects allows us to screen out cases where the political process can provide a remedy. The responsiveness element asks whether the party out of power can alter its fate by persuading voters to support it in future elections-i.e., whether a disparate partisan impact will endure throughout the decade following redistricting or even beyond. If a map is responsive, then when voters change their allegiances, their representation also changes, making judicial intervention unnecessary. 44 An analogy from another domain of voting rights case law is pertinent. If we look at a term of art such as racially polarized voting, whose determination is critical in most racial vote dilution and racial gerrymandering cases, it turns out that there are multiple ways we might measure the level of racial polarization in a given jurisdiction, including homogeneous precinct analysis (Loewen, 1982) , ecological regression (Grofman, Migalski and Noviello, 1985) , and ecological inference (King, 1997) . The latest of these methods, ecological inference, has the best statistical properties, but rests on much more mathematically complex foundations. Yet, when voting is clearly racially polarized, when the appropriate data needed by each method is available, in the hands of competent experts it really does not matter much which of these methods is used (Cf. Grofman, 2000) . 45 As Gary King (personal communication, 2016) noted in comments on an earlier version of this essay, when it comes to partisan asymmetry: "You can say that some methods are more sophisticated and thus give considerably more precision and less error; others may be more intuitive in how they are calculated; others are just different ways of doing the same thing; still others do the same thing but present concepts in different ways that may be useful to understand from yet other perspectives. We know more about how to estimate partisan bias than we ever have, and the Justices can be confident that improvements will continue, and no massive changes in the estimates will come from this process." 
Ruling out electoral geography and chance as explanations for the disparate impact
The approach that is most directly linked to the definition of partisan gerrymandering given at the beginning of this article requires us to look at a large number of computer generated "randomly drawn" plans that generate the requisite number of contiguous districts. Such plans would be generated using units of aggregation such as voting precincts or elements of census geography such as blocks or tracts, and are based on the actual electoral geography. In addition to contiguity, the computer can also be programmed to seek to satisfy other of the set of what are Table 3 ) that put constraints on districting. 49 These include criteria such as the one person, one vote standard, respect for political subunit boundaries, and compactness -as variously measured (Niemi et al., 1990) . The computer can assess the extent to which each of these computer generated plans satisfies the given criterion, and can also can assess information that would be relevant to determining whether the plan violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the 14 th Amendment. 50 The next step is to compare the expected/projected partisan outcomes in the actual plan with the distribution of partisan outcomes in the randomly drawn plans. But the relevant comparison is not with the totality of such plans, but only with the subset of such plans that equal or surpass the challenged plan with respect to the satisfaction of the constitutional and statutory criteria that are deemed legally relevant.
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By restricting ourselves to plans that are at least a good in good government terms as the challenged plan, we have a direct way to implement the idea that gerrymandering is to be judged Table in Grofman, 1985) They are also found enumerated in court cases where courts have drawn redistricting plans of their own in situations where they have been forced to do so by the failure of states to remedy an unconstitutional districting in a timely fashion (see e.g., Grofman, 2015) . 51 However, another way in which a computer simulation of alternative plans can be relevant is by using it to show that, when the computer is instructed to take good government criteria into account, the plans that result satisfy those good government criteria (e.g., splitting of subunit boundaries) to a far greater extent, on average, than does the challenged plan. Thus the challenged plan cannot be justified by a claim that the partisan advantages it creates were required by attentiveness to neutral and legitimate factors. 52 Because we are using the results of neutrally drawn plans based on the geography as our baseline for comparison, we are implicitly allowing for biases in partisan outcome that may arise from differential geographic concentration of partisan voting strength. Whether such geographically induced biases should be addressed in the remedy if a plan has been held to be (2002)), vastly improved computing power permits experts to create hundreds (or even millions) of computer-generated alternative maps. These computer-generated maps enable experts to identify the precise quantum of disparate treatment that is "man-made"-the product of deliberate efforts of the party in power to penalize the opposition-as distinct from the level of disparity that may be produced by the effects of ordinary districting practices, concern to avoid racial vote dilution, voters' residential patterns, or chance. The work of Rodden (2013, 2015) illustrates the methodology of computer based simulations of redistricting maps, 53 as does that of Cho and Liu (2016) and Cain et al. (2018) . Both Professor Chen and Professor
Cho have provided expert witness testimony in recent partisan gerrymandering court cases, and unconstitutional we regard as entirely a legal question that remains to be resolved by courts, By analogy with the racial gerrymandering cases the answer could be yes, in that packing of racial populations are treated as a potential constitutional violation when that packing is intentional and is "unnecessary" for the purposes of providing the protected group an "equal opportunity to elect candidates of choice." Compliance with supposed neutral criteria may lead to inadvertent advantages to one party. There is some evidence that "political groups that tend to cluster (as is the case with Democratic voters in cities [c]ould be systematically affected by what might be called a 'natural' packing effect," Vieth, 541 U.S. at 290 (plurality)-although new empirical evidence indicates that this effect has been overstated. McGann et al. (2016, 135) assert: "[G]eographic and demographic constraints (such as the urban concentration of Democratic voters, the requirement to draw majority-minority districts, and the geographic sorting of voters) cannot account for the level of partisan bias we observe, and certainly cannot account for the increase in bias we observe between the 2000 and 2010 districting rounds."
53 See also Chen and Cottrell (2016) . 
Feasible remedy
Without a feasible remedy, there cannot be a cause for action. Thus, I am inclined to think that the burden is on plaintiffs to offer to the court a plan that both remedies the injury and satisfies constitutional and statutory standards to at least the same degree as the challenged plan.
That plan may not be the plan that the court adopts, and the court may choose to defer to the legislature in redrawing lines to deal with the constitutional violation found, but there must be evidence that a remedy is possible. However, in the present absence of a decision by courts laying down clear standards for what counts as a violation, it seems reasonable to allow plaintiffs to defer the offering of a remedy until after the finding of a constitutional violation.
Once a plan has been held to be an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, on the one hand, plaintiffs might offer proposals for remedy that may actually tilt the partisan bias in the other direction; while, on the other hand, when legislators are given a second bite at the apple, legislators with partisan motivations will seek to minimize the partisan consequence of the changes that they propose and/or only make cosmetic changes. From a social science perspective the most important question about remedy is how far reaching it needs to be. Courts are going to have to be attentive to how much change in a plan found unconstitutional will be required. For example, if the estimated partisan advantage to one party had been four seats, is a proposed remedy plan reducing that estimated advantage to three seats adequate?
Here social science evidence can be very relevant. If evidence has been presented using computer simulations of alternative plans and their expected partisan effects, such computer simulations can help courts assess the range of expected outcomes under a neutral line drawing 54 A rather different computer algorithm is discussed in Chikina, Frieze, and Pegden (2017 Sometimes, courts may be in a situation where they have to craft the remedy, themselves, perhaps via the appointment of a Special Master. Partisan gerrymandering, as defined above, is a feature of a plan as a whole, but is achieved by devices such as packing and cracking in particular districts. 57 My own experience in line drawing suggests strongly that remedying partisan gerrymandering might be done by seeking to adjust boundaries in a relatively limited number of districts, namely those where the cracking and/or packing have been most extreme.
Of course, in remedying packing or cracking in any given district, of necessity there will be changes that "ripple" to affect adjacent districts. While the ripple effects of changes to remedy 56 In some cases such unnecessarily packed majority-minority districts will be a heritage of plans drawn by Democrats in earlier decades, but the perpetuation of the packing in a Republican drawn plan can nonetheless contribute to a gerrymander that harms Democrats as a class. 57 The two basic gerrymandering techniques for single seat plurality elections (Grofman, 1985) are dispersal of minority voting strength (cracking) and concentration of minority voting strength (packing). See also Owen and Grofman (1988) . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 59 60
constitutional violations can be limited, 58 it is a legal issue about the extent to which any deference must be paid to a plan that overall is so tainted by partisan bias that we could describe it as originating from what we might call "partisan lust," especially when such plans violate good government criteria to an extent that would be inappropriate in a court-drawn plan. In particular, it is a legal issue not yet resolved by courts about the extent to which any deference must be paid to incumbency protection in such egregious partisan gerrymanders, since the achievement of incumbent status is so inexorably tainted by the partisan nature of the map.
Ascertaining intent
In Davis v. Bandemer, when it declared partisan gerrymandering to be in principle justiciable, the Supreme Court majority downplayed the importance of intent in determining whether or not a plan was a partisan gerrymander. The Court majority thought that intent to engage in partisan maximizing could be more or less taken for granted as a motivation if the control of the redistricting process (and control of the governorship in states where the governor possessed veto power over redistricting plans) was unified in the hands of a single party. 58 For example in Personhuballah v. Alcorn, a case that involved race related gerrymandering in Virginia's 3 rd congressional district, the court-imposed remedy for a Shaw-type violation necessarily made changes that impacted not just CD3 but also the four districts that immediately touched CD3. Thus the remedy affected five districts, not just one. However, the changes were minimal in three of the four of the districts that bordered CD3, and six of the eleven congressional districts in the state were left completely untouched (Grofman, 2015) . 59 One Supreme Court Justice suggested in the oral argument in Gill that we require unified control before a partisan gerrymandering challenge can be brought, since without unified partisan control the majority party may find itself unable to pass an egregious partisan plan or may see it vetoed by a governor of the opposite party. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
We have focused here on aiding courts in understanding the social-science tools for isolating disparate partisan effects since, if the disparate burden on voters cannot be explained by neutral factors, or compelling state purposes, or chance, then intentional partisan gerrymandering can be inferred.
60 This is not, however, to say that non-statistical evidence of intent is irrelevant.
For example, even setting aside questions of legislative privileges, legislators' publicly available statements can be evidence of an intent to maximize partisan advantage. So, too, can analyses of the shifting of blocs of voters between districts to "pack" or "crack" particular groups, or the disparate treatment of incumbents. 61 Deviations from the ordinary legislative process, such as secrecy, limited debate, or party-line voting 62 in the enactment of the map are also clearly relevant. And although invidious partisan gerrymanders can look visually "pretty" while still maximizing partisan advantage, contorted district lines and disregard for traditional districting criteria, even if not themselves illegal, are sure fire signals that some form of gerrymandering is afoot.
60 Cf. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 398-402 (1986) (using statistical analysis in Title VII case to rule out potential neutral reasons for racial disparities in salaries).
61 "Hijacking" pairs incumbents of the same party in one district, ensuring that one will not be reelected. "Kidnapping" removes a disfavored incumbent's core supporters from her district, reducing her chances of reelection. ProPublica, "Redistricting, a Devil's Dictionary" (Nov. 2, 2011), https://tinyurl.com/y9uuagw8. I believe that A Wuffle is responsible for the coining of the term "kidnapping." Ceteris paribus, incumbents generally garner more votes than other members of the same party running in the same district (King and Gelman, 1991) . 62 The absence of strict party-line voting should be viewed in context. Some incumbent members of the disadvantaged party may have incentives to support a districting plan that affords them (or friends on their side of the aisle) a safe legislative or congressional seat, or that creates a congressional seat that they might run for in the future. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 59 60
III. Legal and Evidentiary Issues
New types of expert witness testimony critical to a holding of unconstitutional gerrymandering
In past work, I have argued that a standard for unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering should be based on the severity of partisan asymmetry. The five Justices who referenced partisan asymmetry in their opinions in LULAC (based largely on the discussion of that method in an Amicus Brief in the case by Gary King, Bernard Grofman and others), asserted that partisan asymmetry should be a component of any test for unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, but they also made it clear that, standing alone, it is not enough. 63 As should be apparent from the discussion above, now, with the hindsight/insight gained in the more than a decade since that Amicus, I fully agree with that conclusion. In my view, proof of partisan asymmetry is not sufficient, but it is definitely is necessary.
Here I have argued that, in addition to partisan asymmetry, a test for unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering also should include evidence about the expected durability of partisan bias, and evidence that allows us to rule out geographic and chance factors as explanations for the observed/projected disparate impact, i.e., it should require evidence of causation. In the previous sections I have identified social science tools that address each of these issues:
measures of partisan bias to determine the severity of disparate impact in the challenged plan; use of data on past inter-election electoral tides and data on district level competitiveness in the challenged plan to assess the likely durability of the plan's partisan effects; and computer simulations of "randomly drawn" alternative plans to see how likely we would have found the extreme partisan outcomes observed in the challenged plan in plans that are just as good as the challenged plan with respect to traditional districting criteria.
63 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer identified partisan asymmetry as "a helpful (though certainly not talismanic) tool," provided one recognizes that "asymmetry alone is not a reliable measure of unconstitutional partisanship." Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg) suggested that the standard would be applied only after at least one election has been held under the redistricting plan at issue. 65 The primary evidence in Bandemer was that a single election had yielded slightly disproportionate results. 478 U.S. at 134 (plurality). The Bandemer plaintiffs offered no evidence of partisan asymmetry, lack of responsiveness or causation. Instead of partisan asymmetry, they offered proportionality as their standard. But as Indiana's expert witness in that case pointed out, it is "totally fallacious … that a discrepancy between vote share and seat share of more than a few percentage points is proof of intentional gerrymandering." (Grofman, 1985, 120) . Nor did the plaintiffs in Bandemer offer any evidence of lack of responsiveness, leaving unrebutted the State's contention that if the plaintiffs won even an "additional few percentage points …, they would have obtained a majority … in both houses." Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 135 (plurality). Finally, plaintiffs failed to prove causation because their test left unaddressed the potential for discrepancies in treatment caused merely by "natural advantages." (Grofman, supra, at 120) . See also Grofman (1982) . 66 Of course, the fact that technology of computer simulated plans has only recently developed to the point of being able to readily creating compelling evidence on the causality prong is an obvious reason why no such evidence was offered in partisan gerrymandering cases previous to the present decade.
67 In Vieth, the plaintiffs took a somewhat different tack than the plaintiffs in Bandemer. They argued for a two-pronged test: (1) a predominant intent to achieve partisan advantage, shown through the subordination of neutral and legitimate criteria ); and (2) a "totality of the circumstances" determination that the map would have the effects of "thwart[ing] the plaintiffs' ability to translate a majority of votes into a majority of seats," (Vieth, 541 U.S. at 284-87 (plurality)).The effects prong of this test focused on the wrong criteria: It claimed that a party that won the majority of votes was entitled to a majority of seats, without establishing any differential treatment of voters based on their political views and associations. The case was decided on a motion to dismiss, and because no election had taken place under the challenged plan, the plaintiffs' claim of adverse effects rested solely on an allegation that, in the future, they would be deprived of a majority of Pennsylvania's congressional seats, despite achieving a majority of the statewide vote. Id. at 272-73, 287. The plurality asserted that the effects claim reduced to a claim of proportional representation, similar to the proportionality test rejected in Bandemer. Id. at 288. And of course, there was no evidence of durability or causation offered. In LULAC, the district court did hear limited expert evidence regarding partisan asymmetry that examined how many seats each party would win if, hypothetically, each obtained 50% of the statewide vote (548 U.S. at 466-68, Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But, plaintiffs abandoned this evidence by the time they got to the Supreme Court. Instead, their theory of the case was that the sole motive for the Texas legislature's decision to engage in middecennial redistricting was to reap partisan advantage. Id. at 416-17(opinion of Kennedy, J.). In other words, plaintiffs' theory depended only on intent. In fact, plaintiffs argued that "courts need not inquire about, nor parties prove, the discriminatory effects of partisan gerrymandering. Id. at 417 (emphasis added).
68 While I will not discuss the specific expert witness conclusions, what cannot be disputed is that the evidence presented at trial in these cases involved multiple experts and a multicomponented approach that reflects advances in social science knowledge that have occurred in the decade since LULAC about how to measure gerrymandering, as well as incorporating technological advances in our ability to use the computer to generate alternative plans. what electoral features to measure; standards tell us when the measurements provided by expert witnesses about these various plan features take us from "politics as usual" to unconstitutionality.
Metrics tend to come from the social sciences; standards tend to come from courts. Above we have identified well established social science methods that will allow us to rather precisely specify metrics for disparate impact, and durability, and a straightforward way to use computer simulations to assess causation.
I propose that courts craft a standard for unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering that draw on these metrics in ways that parallel how courts have dealt with metrics provided by social scientists in other voting rights contexts, such as one person, one vote and racial vote dilution.
While no single number tells it all, the five pronged approach identifies the numerical, geographic and historical information that is needed --evidence that can straightforwardly be presented by experts and readily evaluated by courts. In situations where legislatures are doing the line drawing, politics will always play a role in the establishment of congressional and legislative boundaries, but that we need also ask whether those considerations "though generally permissible, were applied in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective" Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In other words, did "politics" go "too far" in infringing upon fundamental associational and representational rights?
The Similarly, if we look to specifying what is needed to find a violation, for causation, courts might rely on jurisprudence in other civil rights arenas that look to evidence of statistical patterns that are two or more standard deviations outside the norm. And, when we look to evidence of durability, we can assess the likelihood that an existing partisan balance would be perpetuated based on projections using historical patterns of electoral tides and evidence on levels of competitiveness in the present districts. Finally, re intent, courts already regularly assess intent in a variety of constitutional and statutory setting and can readily examine the history of line drawing.
Of course, it is not enough to operationalize standards to identify unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering if these standards cannot be use to provide both internal and external judicial manageability. By external judicial manageability, I mean the development of an easy to 70 In Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009), in a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court tightened the Gingles standard by requiring an initial showing that there existed a remedy plan with at least one additional district in which the minority group constituted a majority of the citizen voting age population. However, districts with a lower minority population may yet be ones that present the minority community with an equal opportunity to elect candidates of choices. Moreover, the packing of minority populations to an unnecessary extent can also be evidence of racial gerrymandering and usually has partisan consequences as well. The approach to partisan gerrymander advocated here, specifying necessary elements of any standard to be used to determine what constitutes an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, could be used to generate a test for unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering inspired by the structure of (though largely substantively different from) the three-pronged test for vote dilution laid down in Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) . Like the Thornburg test it is based on a set of necessary conditions. Like the Thornburg test it proposes metrics that are well defined in the social science literature --ones whose measurement is something competent experts can provide.
Thus, I believe it, too, satisfies both internal and external criteria of manageability. Each of its parts (a) is relatively simple and can be explained intuitively in terms that any intelligent lay person could understand (especially with use of maps and graphs), 71 (b) is conceptually distinct, (c) fits into a theoretical whole that satisfies our common sense understanding about what it is that we are trying to prove, and (d) has statistical elements that themselves to the eventual development of something like bright line legal thresholds Moreover, rather than get into the rather murky domain of fairness, it offers criteria based on neutral treatment.
71 Not only are the three concepts of partisan asymmetry, durability and causation relatively intuitive, but the methods for measuring them more transparent than the statistical methods that courts routinely rely on in Voting Rights Act cases to infer how racial minorities vote. See generally Grofman (2000) . 72 The history of voting rights jurisprudence can largely be viewed as a movement from cases whose facts paint them as "horribles" to ones whose case facts are such that the "correct" result is far less obvious. Litigation, by and large, leads to incremental change in the law, and greater specificity, but there can be tectonic shifts, as when something like a bright line test (such as the three prongs of Gingles) replaces or supplements a less precise test such as one based on the "totality of the circumstances." (Grofman, 1992) 73 In the one person, one vote, and racial vote dilution the history of litigation can be seen as taking us from decisions about metrics (e.g., total population deviation versus average population deviation versus minimum population needed to control a majority of the districts), to decisions about standards. In particular, over a set of cases, the Supreme Court clarified how the standard for "one person, one vote" compliance is different for state legislatures than for Congress. 74 "Clear and compelling evidence" is the standard proposed by Judge Baylson in his dissenting opinion in the challenge to Pennsylvania's congressional districts, Agre v. Wolf (Case 2:17-cv-04392-MMB E.D. PA.; Document 213, filed January 10, 2018; slip op. at page 6), and while far from precise, such a standard might be a starting point if, in using it, courts were to also to identify the concepts /metrics that specify the relevant evidence. The ideas in this paper are very closely related to the approaches taken in Whitford and in
Rucho.
What I have sought to do is to lay out, from a social science perspective, both the relevant metrics that were central to the empirical findings in these opinions and the relevant social science tools for estimating these metrics, so as to demonstrate manageability. If a multipronged standard for partisan gerrymandering were to be adopted based on the metrics and methods discussed in this essay, courts will be able to apply it coherently and consistently across cases, to distinguish and identify those egregious partisan gerrymanders that go above and beyond normal politics to invidiously target opposition voters for unequal treatment. 75 I very much hope that courts will seize upon these ideas as a path out of the present morass. Otherwise, politicians will have every incentive to wield the technological advances in computer-based 75 Any disparate burden on voters is measured relative to the baseline created by neutral factors (single-member, winner-take-all elections; compliance with constitutional requirements and the Voting Rights Act; the actual residential patterns of the electorate; map-drawing practicalities like contiguity and a respect for local subdivisions and communities of interests, and a preference for compact districts). Moreover, failing to deal with partisan gerrymandering will not substantially reduce the redistricting litigation coming to the courts. As long as they have no way to address egregious partisan gerrymandering, litigants will seek to address pernicious and likely to be durable partisan gerrymanders by bringing other sorts of challenges, including ones brought under a Shaw v. Reno standard. Until the Supreme Court grasps the nettle of specifying a test for unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, present voting rights case law is flawed because it (a) allows legislators to claim intentional and even egregious partisan gerrymandering as their predominant motive as a way to escape racial gerrymandering claims under Shaw, thus forcing complex trials that hinge on accusations of racial motive, (b) allows line drawers to use racial gerrymandering to achieve partisan ends in such a fashion that, even if the racial gerrymandering is reduced by remedy brought about by a Shaw-type lawsuit, this may still leave untouched all or most of the partisan effects of the plan, and (c) there can be partisan effects of line drawing not tied to race, which will go legally unchallenged/unchallengeable. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
